A Brief

# DISCOURSE

Concerning the Different

# WITS of MEN:

Written

At the Request of a Gentleman, Eminent in Virtue, Learning, Fortune.

In the Year 1664.

And now Published with Consent of the Author.

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# OF THE DIFFERENT WITS OF MEN.

## SECT. I.

### ARTICLE 1.

*Noble Sir,*

IF I have taken a whole Month to anſwer your laſt Letter, it hath been only becauſe I ould not ſo much as ſhew my illingneſs to do it in leſs

time : the Command You were pleaſed therein to ſend me, being of ſo abſtruſe and difficult a nature, that to perform it with accurateneſs in any proportion correſpendent to either its own dignity, or Your Curioſity, would require not one, but many Months, yea Years, though my Abilities were much greater than even the Ignorant and Envious believe them to be. You have, therefore, more of reaſon to blame me for Haſte, than for Delay; in that I now render You ſo negligent an account of my diligence in managing the Province You aſsigned me : and if this Paper bring rather an end to Your Expectation, than ſatiſfaction to Your Judgement; You are obliged in Equity to look upon

n it as a *Specimen* rather of my *bedience*, than of my *Learning*. For, ad I not preferred the ſuggeſti-ns of my Duty, as a friend, to the ounſel of my Reaſon, as an In-uirer into Nature; You may aſ-ure Your ſelf, it would have been ery long, before I ſhould have een brought thus freely to ex-oſe my Weakneſs to You, who re ſo well able to diſcern it. But my comfort is, though You re ſharp-ſighted, You are alſo Good-natured: not more apt to iſcover than to conceal mens in-rmities and failings. Having hen the ſame excuſe both for my Tardity and for my Haſte; nd confiding intirely in Your Candor: behold, I put into Your hands the following Diſcourſe, o which Your Command gave

the first and sole *Occasion*, and in which I have plainly and briefly delivered both my thin Collections, and present Thoughts, concerning the *Different Wits* of Men.

ART. 2.

For, though *Wit*, or *Natural Capacity of Understanding*, seems to be the only thing wherein Nature hath been equally bountiful to all Mankind; every one thinking he hath enough, and even those who in their Appetites and Desires of other things are insatiable, seldom wishing for more of that excellent Endowment: Yet nothing is more evident than this, that some have more Wit than others, and that

Men

len are thereby no leſs diſtin-
uiſhable each from other, than
y their ſeveral Faces and Tem-
ers.

ART. 3.

To enumerate, then, all theſe
*Differences*, would be a work al-
moſt infinite; to define where-
n they generally conſiſt, ex-
reamly hard; to ſelect and de-
cribe the moſt remarkable of
hem, highly uſefull. For, when
Men ſhould by the help of ſuch
Deſcriptions be brought to ſee
he Principal and Ruling Incli-
nations (for the moſt part the
nſeparable Concomitants of
heir Wits) that advance or de-
preſs their Eſtimation and For-
tunes in the World, reduced to a

few Heads or Kinds: it would be no hard matter for them to find out the ſeveral Advantages deducible from thence. Firſt, every one might contemplate, as in a Mirrour, ſome part at leaſt of his *own* Image, and know in what *Claſſis* to rank himſelf. Then, by obſerving what is *beautiful* or *deform* in the picture of another, he might the better judge of what himſelf either *deſires* or *fears* to be. Again, ſince *Virtues* and *Vices* mutually incroach upon each others confines, and that no *Ingeny* is ſo propenſe to Vices, but that it retains a capacity of being kept from Exorbitancy, and by the ſtrict rains of Prudence inflected to their neighbouring Virtues; and on the other ſide, none is ſo

neerly

neerly allied to this or that Virtue, but may by imprudence be corrupted, ſo as to ſwerve toward ſome bordering Vice: it could not be unprofitable to view the *Copies* of ſuch *Inclinations*, attended by their good or evil *Conſequents*, and from thence to collect how far they might *benefit* or *hurt*, if followed. In fine, by ſuch general Characters, we might learn how to moderate our *Praiſes* of ſome Perſons, and our cauſeleſs *Averſation* from others; than which nothing is more neceſſary in *Converſation*, eſpecially in election of a *Friend*.

But, alas! Sir, ſuch a Work as this doth yet remain among the *Deſiderata* in Philoſophy, and ſo is likely ever to do for me, who

am so conscious of the many Herculean Difficulties therein to be encountred and overcome; that I find my self more inclined to wish, than capable to perform it. You ought not, therefore, to wonder, if instead thereof I adventure to present You this rude Essay.

## SECT. II.

### ART. I.

THat Faculty of the Mind, which is commonly understood by the word WIT, being a thing whereof Men have formed to themselves various *Conceptions*, and for which they have accordingly invented various

ns *Names*; it must needs be difficult to determine what is thereby meant, and what denomination is most agreeable and proper thereunto. Nor is it less difficult to investigate the *Nature* thereof, and wherein it doth chiefly consist: the *Oeconomy* of the *Brain* of Man being one of those *Arcana* of Nature, whose knowledge the wise Creator seems to have reserved to Himself.

As for the several *Names* or Words by which it is most usually expressed; I am obliged to recount and explain them to you briefly, that so being delivered from *Ambiguity* (one of the greatest impediments to Science) You may soon be able to judge which of them is *Equivocal*, which *Adæquate* and proper. The

The *Latin* word, *Ingenium* though ſometimes uſed even by the beſt and moſt accurate Writers, and who lived in the Golden Age of that Language, to ſignify the power of *Underſtanding* proper to Mankind; as may be inſtanced in that memorable ſentence of *Salluſt*, (*in initio Belli Catilinarii*) *Mihi rectius eſſe videtur, ingenij, quàm virium opibus gloriam quærere*: Yet we find it moſt frequently uſed to denote a mans natural *Inclination* or *Propenſion* to ſome things or actions more than to others, whether virtuous or vicious; as may appear, among a thouſand other inſtances, from that ſaying of the ſame judicious *Hiſtorian*, in his Character of *Catiline*; *Fuit magnâ vi & animi & corporis*,

*rporis, ſed ingenio malo, & pravo*; nd from that of *Suetonius*, re- ting that *Tiberius* connived at ome youthful debaucheries of *aligula*, *Si per has manſuefieri poſſet erum ejus ingenium.*

## Art. 2.

Sometimes by *Wit* is underſtood *Aptneſs to Diſcipline*, or Promptitude to learn: which the ancient *Græcians*, both Philoſophers and Orators, called Εὐμαθία; the *Latines*, *Docilitas*, *& bona indoles*, to which our Language hath no word anſwerable, but *Towardlineſs*, now almoſt obſolete. If you enquire wherein this happy Faculty doth conſiſt, they tell you, that it is not ſimple, but compoſed of three others.

The

The *First* of which is named Ὀξύτης, *Acumen*, & (μεταφορικῶς) *celeritas discendi*, or, as *Xenophon*, ταχύτης τῆς διανοίας, a quick or nimble apprehension of what is taught: though I remember the word ὀξύτης to be not seldom applyed to *Acerbity* and *Cruelty* of disposition; as by *Arrianus* in that phrase, κατὰ τ βασιλέως ὀξυτῆτα.

The *Second*, Ἀγχινόια (*ab* ἀγχι, *propè*, & νόημι, *animadverto, cogito, inspicio*) which is defined to be Δύναμις τοῦ ἐξ ὧν ἔμαθε θηρέυειν καὶ ἃ μὴ ἔμαθεν, a Faculty whereby a man, from what he hath learned, hunts after what he hath not learned: the same with that the *Romans* termed *Sagacitas*, and our incomparable Mr. *Hobbs* renders *Ranging*.

The

The *Third*, Μνήμη, *Memoria*; τήρησις ὧν ἔμαθε τις, *Retention* of what is learned.

ART. 3.

Here, *Sir*, You have both the true *Notion* and *Parts* of Docility conveniently expreſſed; but yet you are to ſeek, whether Wit and Docility be alwaies one and the ſame thing. For, Docility, if reſtrained only to Arts and Sciences, though it neceſſarily implyes a good capacity of underſtanding in the Perſon, by the bounty of Nature, therewith enriched: yet can it not be thence inferred, that all men who want this Docility, want alſo wit; becauſe then none could have wit, but

but *Scholars* alone, and becauſe Experience ſufficiently demonſtrates that many laudable Wits are naturally averſe from the ſtudy of Letters, and in that reſpect perhaps alſo incapable of proficiency in them. So that what *Anatomiſts* generally ſay of the ſigns of Virginity, namely that the appearance of them is a certain evidence of the Brides Chaſtity; but the non-appearance, no proof of her deflowerment before Marriage; may with equal truth be ſaid of this Docility; it cannot be without a good Wit, but a good Wit may ſometimes be without that. Learning, You know, is but Wit cultivated; the ſeeds thereof are Natural, and grow up of themſelves, and many times bring forth fruits both

both pleaſant and uſeful, without the help of Art, eſpecially where their Luxuriancy is prevented by virtuous education, and their maturity promoted by ingenious converſation. If wit, then, may ſubſiſt without *Learning*, certainly it may ſubſiſt without *Docility*, *i. e.* a facility of learning Arts and Sciences.

Beſides, if we divide *Docility* into its three parts newly deſcribed, and diſtribute them among three Men, allowing to one quickneſs of *Apprehenſion*, to the ſecond *Sagacity* in hunting after conſequences, and ſtrength of *Memory* to the third: this will not be ſufficient to direct us to make a judgement, which of the three ought to have the praiſe of the beſt

beſt *Wit* : becauſe therein they may all be Equal. For, we want not the teſtimony of daily obſervation, that many excellent Wits have but weak Memories; and as many of admirable Memories are yet dull of Apprehenſion; and again many, who are good at Ranging after Conſequences, though it be neceſſary that they remember well (becauſe it is from the reminiſcence of what they have known, that they infer what they ſeek) are yet but ſlow of Conception. Hereupon I am of opinion, that Wit and Docility, though frequently Concomitant, are yet diſtinct Faculties, and therefore require both Names and Notions diſtinct.

Many

Many other words there are uſed alſo by the *Romans* to ſignifie Wit; as *perſpicacia, ſolertia, ſubtilitas, dexteritas, felicitas ingenij, &c.* but theſe being all *Metaphorical*, are therefore *Ambiguous*, nor worthy a particular examination.

ART. 4.

Nor is our Engliſh word, *Wit*, (which ſome of our *Gloſſaries* derive from the Teutonic *Witz*, to underſtand; and others from the Latine *Videlicet* contracted into *viz.* becauſe inſtead thereof we ſay *to witt*) altogether exempt from *Ambiguity*: as being indifferently uſed to ſignifie either the *Faculty* of underſtanding it ſelf, or the *Act* or Effect of that Faculty,

culty, in the former ſenſe, when we ſay, *ſuch a man hath a great Wit*: in the latter, when we give the name of Wit to a *jeſt*, pleaſant *conceipt*, or *facete* expreſsion, ſuch as the *Latins* call *ſales, lepores, facetiæ*; the *Italians, Scherzo, giuoco, burla*; and the French, *raillerie* and *gaudiſſerie*.

## SECT. III.

### ART. 1.

FRom the recital of the Names, we paſs to the conſideration of the *Nature* of Wit.

The Underſtanding of a Man. (You know, Sir) is commonly meaſured either by the rectitude of

of his *Judgement*, or the celerity of his *Imagination*.

By *Judgement*, we distinguish subtilty in objects neerly resembling each other, and discerning the real dissimilitude betwixt them, prevent delusion by their apparent similitude. This *Act* of the Mind the Grecians term Διάγνωσις, the Latins, *Judicium* and *Dignotio*; and we, *Discretion*. The *Faculty* it self, *Aristotle* (*Ethic.* 6. *c.* 7.) names Ευσυνεσία, the Latins, *subtilitas ingenij*; from them the Italians, *sottigliezza*, and *sottilitá*; the French, *subtilitè*; and we, *subtilty*, which is no other but a certain perspicacity of the Mind, whereby it is able to compare things one with another, and discern the difference betwixt

them, notwithſtanding they appear very much alike. Herein *Old* men (*cæteris paribus*) uſually excel *Young*; becauſe by long Experience (which is nothing elſe but *Remembrance* of what Antecedents have been followed by what Conſequents) they have learned the *Marks* or ſigns, by which things are to be compared and diſtinguiſhed: and Men of *nimble Apprehenſion* (*cæteris paribus*) have the advantage of thoſe who are of *ſlow*; becauſe they obſerve more ſigns of difference in leſs time.

ART. 2.

By *Imagination*, on the contrary, we conceive ſome certain ſimilitude in objects really unlike, and

and pleaſantly confound them in diſcourſe: Which by its unexpected *Fineneſs* and alluſion, ſurpriſing the Hearer, renders him leſs curious of the truth of what is ſaid. This is very evident in the uſe of *Simile's*, *Metaphors*, *Allegories* and other *Tropes* and *Figures* of *Rhetorick*; which are therefore called the *Ornaments* of ſpeech, ſerving rather for plauſibility, than for demonſtration. And, indeed, their power over the Affections of the greateſt part of Mankind, whether by the word Affection we underſtand what the Grecians call Πάθος *Paſſion*, or what they term Ἦθος *Mores*, *Manners*; is ſo great, that the whole Art of *Oratory* is grounded thereupon, and he is the moſt Excellent in that Art, who by the

help of those Φαντασίαι or *Images*, of things absent formed in his Imagination, doth represent them in so lively colours, that they appear present. Hereupon doubtless it was, that *Quintilian* (*institut. Orator. lib.* 6. *cap.* 11.) saith, a good Orator must be Ευφαντασιώτος *qui sibi res, voces, actus, secundum verum optimè fingat.*

Now the Imagination be in common to all Men (yea and to Brute Animals also) yet is it not equal in all Men. Some are naturally endowed *Celeritate imaginandi*, with a quickness of imagination, that is, an easie succession of one thought upon another: others are but slow of imagination, which defect of the Mind is called *Tarditas ingenij*, dulness, and

and if great, *ſtupor*, ſtupidity or ſottiſhneſs.

From *Celerity* of Imagination there ariſeth a twofold difference of Wit. *Some* are naturally inclined to indulge their thoughts the liberty of *Ranging*, and love not to confine them: *Others* delight in *fixing* their mind upon one object, and narrowly examining it. The *former* ſort are allowed to have *Laudabilem Phantaſiam*; and have a Genius diſpoſed to Poëſy and Invention: unleſs their Phanſie be immoderately quick and ranging; for then it paſſes into *Folly*, ſuch as theirs, who are not able to finiſh the diſcourſe they have begun, being ſuddenly taken off and carryed away by new thoughts altogether impertinent.

Which undecent ſhifting of thoughts is properly named *Extravagancy*. The *Latter* are ſaid to have *Judicium probabile*; and therefore are fit to ſtudy Philoſophy, Civil Law, and Controverſies.

ART. 3.

For the moſt part both theſe Virtues of the Mind are indeed conjoyned in the ſame Perſons; but ſeldom equally eminent: and the ſeveral degrees of pre-dominion of the one over the other, conſtitute the chief differences of Men, as to Wit or Underſtanding. Phanſie without moderation of Judgement, ſeldom attains to commendation: but judgement or Diſcretion, though

though unaſsiſted by Phanſie, alwayes deſerves praiſe.

In *Poets*, both Phanſie and Judgement are required; but Phanſie ought to have the upper hand, becauſe all Poems, of what ſort ſoever, pleaſe chiefly by *Novelty*.

In *Hiſtorians*, Judgement ought to have the chair; becauſe the Virtue of Hiſtory conſiſteth in Method, Truth, and Election of things worthy narration: nor is there need of more Phanſie, than what may ſerve to adorn the ſtile with elegant language.

In *Panegyries*, and *Invectives*, Phanſie ought to take place; becauſe they have for their end not truth,

truth, but praiſe or diſpraiſe, which are effected by compariſons illuſtrious, or vile or ridiculous: and Judgement doth only ſuggeſt Circumſtances, by which the action is rendred laudable or blameable.

In *Hortatives* and *Pleadings* of Cauſes, according as verity or ſimulation doth principally conduce to the advantage of the Argument; ſo Judgement, or Phanſie is to have prehemi-nence.

In *Demonſtration*, in *Counſel*, and in all ſevere inveſtigation of *Truth*, only Judgement is required; unleſs perhaps ſometimes there be occaſion for ſome convenient ſimilitude, to illuſtrate what

what is alledged. But as for Metaphors, they are wholly to be excluded, as equivocal and introductory to fallacy: and therefore to admit them in grave Counsel, or strict Ratiocination, is no less than manifest folly and impertinency. In all serious discourse, if there appear want of Discretion, however pleasant Phansie shall shew it self, yet Wit will be defective: but if Judgement be manifest, though the Phansie be but vulgar, the Wit shall be commended.

ART. 4.

But in all, besides that discretion of times, places and persons, which renders Phansie commendable, and wherein Civil prudence

dence and the good Menage of affairs doth principally consist; there is required also *Constant Prosecution* of the Scope or *End* proposed, that is frequent application of our thoughts to the subject about which we are conversant. For, so there will occur to us apt similitudes, such as will not only illustrate, but also adorn our discourse, and excite pleasure in the hearers by the rarity of their invention. Whereas if there be not a constant regulation of thoughts to some certain End; the more we are conducted by heat of Phansie, the nearer we come to *Extravagancy*, which is a degree of *Madness*; such as is observed in those *Rambling* Wits, who (as we said even now) having entred into discourse of one thing,

thing, are by every new hint, however remote and impertinent, transported from their ſubject into ſo many digreſsions and Parentheſes, that not recovering what at firſt they intended to ſpeak, they loſe themſelves, as in a Labyrinth. The Reaſon of which Errour ſeems to be grounded upon defect of Experience, which makes them imagine that to be new and remarkable, which to more knowing heads is really ſtale and trivial; and that to be great and conſiderable, which to others of more obſervation is not ſo. For, whatever is new, great and memorable, if it occurr to the Mind of one ſpeaking of another ſubject, is wont to ſeduce him from his purpoſe.

ART.

ART. 5.

When a man, therefore, having proposed to himself some certain End, and in his thoughts running over a multitude of things, as means conducible thereunto, doth quickly perceive which of them is most probable, and how it may be brought to effect his design: this man is said to have a *good Wit*, and the *Habit* hereof is called Φρόνησις and Εὐβουλία *Prudence*. Which depends upon Experience and Remembrance of many the like Antecedents, with the like Consequents. But herein men differ not one from another so much as in Judgement and Phansy; because men of equal age, may

may not be very unequal in Experience, as to the quantity, though one hath more of experience in some things, and another in others; since every one hath his particular affairs, concernments and wayes of managing them: and a Husband-man, though rude and illiterate, is yet wiser in his own business, than a Philosopher in another mans. Whence that rule, *Cuiq; in sua arte credendum.*

ART. 6.

To this Prudence if there be conjoyned the use of Means unjust, or dishoneſt, such as Fear, or Poverty doth too often suggest: then it degenerates into that siniſtre Prudence, which is called *Astutia,*

*Aſtutia, Craft* or *Cunning*; which is for the moſt part a ſign of Puſillanimity or poorneſs of Spirit. For, a great Mind ſcorns unjuſt and diſhoneſt helps to bring him to his aimes. There is alſo another ſort of Cunning, called *Verſutia, Evaſion*; which is deferring or putting off for a little time ſome danger or incommodity impendent, by running into worſe: and the word ſeems a derivative from *Verſura*, which ſignifies borrowing of one, to pay another.

Having given You, *Noble Sir*, this ſhort and imperfect account of what I have collected concerning the *Nature* and divers *Notions* of thoſe Intellectual Faculties, which are vulgarly com-

comprehended under the name of *Wit*; and deduced, according to probability, the principal *Differences* thereof from the various degrees of Eminency of *Judgement* and *Phanſy*: the remaining part of the Task You have been pleaſed to aſſign me, is to enquire briefly into the *Cauſes* of thoſe Differences, as well *Final* as *Efficient*; and then *deſcribe* each of them ſingly with as much truth and evidence, as my ſmall obſervation, and leſs Learning ſhall enable me to do.

ART. 7.

But, to prevent miſtake, I am obliged firſt to advertiſe You (what I had almoſt forgotten) that by the Wit I have hitherto

ſpoken of, I mean that which is *Natural*, or which grows up together with us, accrewing only from Uſe and Experience, without the help of Method, culture or Doctrine. For, as to that which they call *Ingenium Acquiſitum*, acquired by ſtudy of Learning and polite Education; I conceive it to be no other but *Reaſon*, which ariſing from the right uſe of ſpeech, produces Arts and Sciences; and ſeems to be only an Effect or Product of the former cultivated by *induſtry*.

SECT.

## SECT. IV.

THus freed from all Ambiguity of Words and Notions commonly applyed to Wit, which otherwiſe might perhaps have led us out of our right way, or at leaſt darkned the proſpect of our Reaſon; let us proceed in our Diſquiſition ſoftly and fairly to prevent ſtumbling: following the conduct of the Method newly propoſed. Which brings us in the next place to conſider the *Final Cauſe* of the great Diverſity of Wits obſerved in Men.

### ART. 1.

What was the *End*, which the *Omniſcient Creator* deſigned to

Himſelf, when He was pleaſed to conſtitute this ſo great and admirable variety; You, Sir, (I know) are too wiſe, too conſcious of the immenſe diſparity betwixt a Finite Nature and an Infinite, to expect I ſhould be able to determine: all His Counſels being to us, poor ignorant things, imperveſtigable, as His Perfections are incomprehenſible. However, ſince we are not forbidden with due reverence to conjecture; You (I hope) will not refuſe to hear my fooliſh ſentiments concerning this problem: eſpecially while I offer them rather to Your Examination, than to Your belief.

When, therefore, I obſerve, that Men are no leſs diſcrimi-

nable

nable each from other by the various Inclinations, Affections and Capacities of their Minds, than by the diſſenting features, lines and aires of their Faces; I am apt to perſwade my ſelf, that *God Almighty*, in making ſo vaſt diſſimilitude, and in that diſtribution of His ſeveral Donatives among Individuals of the ſame *Species*, intended thereby to accommodate Mankind to a *Civil life*: it being no more poſſible for a Society of Men, or Commonwealth, to be compoſed of Members all of the like endowments of Mind; than it is for an Animal to exerciſe various Functions with many Organs all of the ſame parts, ſhape and fabrick; or for Muſical Harmony to reſult from a multitude of Uniſons.

I am not ignorant, that even the beſt Philoſophers, when they contemplate the diverſity of Natures Endowments, and the moſt probable Reaſon thereof, modeſtly bound their Curioſity with this clauſe, that *Nature delights her ſelf in variety*, as well in this as in all other kinds. Nor do I deny what they here ſay to be thus far true, that Nature, as being the Art of God, can have no other perfection, but what is derived from her Author and Governour, whoſe Goodneſs cannot be terminated but in it ſelf; and conſequently all Emanations and Effects of that Goodneſs muſt redound to the delight of their firſt Fountain. Yet this (methinks) doth not oblige us to acquieſce in that conſideration alone,

alone, without all reflection upon our ſelves; there being perhaps ſome other Reaſon or End of ſuch Variety, wherein Mankind may be highly concerned. I conceive, then, that the *Creator* having one Eye directed to the pleaſure redounding to Him from the manifeſtation of His Power and Goodneſs; aimed with the other at ſome general benefit and favour to Man, to whom He purpoſed to be ſingularly indulgent and gracious in all things: and that fore-ſeeing how much more ſecurely, commodiouſly and happily Men might live in *Societies*, than ſingle and diſperſed, as wild Beaſts; He ordained this great diverſity of *Ingenies* among them, as a means to accommodate them to mu-

tual assistance and association. But this I deliver as only probable, not definitive: and leaving it to Your better judgement to be approved or rejected, I pass on to the *Natural* Causes of the diversity under enquiry.

ART. 2.

Wherein I meet with no less obscurity, than in the former. For, though it be sufficiently evident, especially to *Physicians* conversant about diseases of the Head, that the Seat and principal Organ of the *Intellectual Faculties* is the *Brain*; and that they are more or less perfect in their Operations, according to the divers temperament, magnitude, figure and schematism of that noblest Organ;

Organ; and to the greater or leſs Mobility of the *Animal ſpirits* (if any ſuch there be) contained and exerciſed therein: though thus much (I ſay) be ſufficiently manifeſt, yet what temperament, what magnitude, figure and Schematiſme of the Brain produceth *Acuteneſs* of Wit, and what cauſeth *Dulneſs*, is hitherto unknown. Nor have *Anatomiſts*, even in this diſſecting and moſt curious Age, been yet able certainly to inform themſelves, in what part of the Brain that Cœleſtial Gueſt, the reaſonable *Soul*, keeps her Court of Judicature; what part ſhe makes uſe of in Senſation, what in Imagination, what for Memory, or what for Ratiocination. *Veſalius* (I remember) the Prince of Anatomiſts

miſts in the laſt Age, expreſly, nor without deriſion of thoſe who believed and taught the contrary, affirms, that the Fabrick of Mans Brain is not in the leaſt different from that of the Brains of Brutes. The Text is remarkable, the great Authority of the Man conſidered; and therefore I will here tranſcribe it. (*de Corpor. Human. fabric. lib. 7. cap.* 1.)

*Qui in Imaginatione, Ratiocinatione, Cogitatione, Memoria, Cerebrum ſuo fungatur munere; haudquaquam ex ſententia apprehendo: neque quicquam inſuper ab Anatomico, vel Theologorum omnem rationis vim, ac totam ferè Principis nobis vocatæ Animæ facultatem, Brutis Animalibus adimentium occaſione, indagandum*

*dum puto. Quum Cerebri nimirum conſtructione Simia, Canis, Equus, Felis & Quadrupeda quæ hactenus vidi omnia, & Aves etiam univerſæ, plurimaq; Piſcium genera, omni propemodum ex parte Homini correſpondeant: neq; ullum ſecanti occurrat diſcrimen, quod ſecus de Hominis quàm de illorum Animalium functionibus ſtatuendum eſſe præſcribat.*

To this You'l *anſwer* perhaps, that ſuch indeed was the judgement of *Veſalius*; but You are not obliged to acquieſce therein, becauſe You have lately not only read a certain Book, *de Proprietatibus Cerebri Humani*, wherein the Author obſerves many conſiderable *Differences* betwixt the Humane Brain, and thoſe of all other

other Animals; but alſo with Your own eyes behold thoſe Differences demonſtrated by the ſame Author, in ſome Diſſections for that end made by him at the command of the *Royal Society*: and that therefore You hope, if *Anatomiſts* proceed in their diſcoveries, with the ſame accurate ſcrutiny, and the like happy ſucceſs, as of late Years they have done; ſome one of them may at length be ſo fortunate, as to find out the true uſes of all the ſeveral parts of the Brain of Man, and ſo ſolve all the difficulties that now amuſe thoſe, who profoundly conſider the wonderful *Oeconomy* thereof.

I *reply*, therefore; that granting

ing *Veſalius* to have been much miſtaken in that his Opinion concerning the Brain; and that there really are thoſe Differences betwixt Man and all other Animals, which the Book you mention declares: Yet (*Sir*) what I have here ſaid concerning the abſtruſity of the Nature, immediate Inſtruments, and wayes of operation of the Intellectual Faculties, is nevertheleſs too true. For, You cannot but remember, that even the Author of that Treatiſe himſelf doth in the end of it ingenuouſly confeſs, that notwithſtanding his frequent obſervation of thoſe Differences, he was ſtill as ignorant of the principal ſeat of the ſoul, and what parts ſhe made uſe of in her ſeveral Functions, as before

he

he first entred into the Anatomick Theatre. And were it not a *Parergon*, I could collect, and here recount many observations, recorded by Eminent Physicians, of such, who retained the use of their Senses, Imagination, Memory and Reason, without any the least defect, even to the last minute of life; and yet in their Heads opened after death, there was found (as in most Fishes) but very little of Brain, and that little altogether confounded and dissolved in Water. For a memorable Example of this astonishing *Phænomenon*, I take liberty to refer You to *lib.* 1. *cap.* 24. of the Medical observations of *Nich. Tulpius*, a late learned and judicious Physician, and Senator of *Amsterdam*: who relating the various

various Conjectures of ſome of his Colleagues thereupon, gravely concludes with this free confeſſion of his ignorance; *Quantum eſt, quod neſcimus! Velut namq; in aliis, ſic certè credibile eſt, potiſſimùm nos cœcutire in genuino Cerebri regimine: cujus opera multo fortaſſis ſunt diviniora, quàm quiſpiam hactenus ſuo comprehendit captu.* As for Your expectation of further diſcoveries from Anatomy, that may afford more light to direct the *Virtuoſi* in their reſearches into this dark Argument; I cannot indeed divine what time may bring forth: but am of Opinion, that there is leſs reaſon for Your *Hope*, than for Your *Wiſh* for any ſuch diſcovery; the nature of Mans *Mind* being ſuch, that it cannot underſtand it ſelf.

*Adeò*

*Adeò Animo non poteſt liquere de cæteris rebus, ut adhuc ipſe ſe quærat: Senec. Natur. Quæſt. lib. 7. cap. 24.*

ART. 3.

You are not then to wonder, if I acknowledge my ſelf unable to define from what various Conſtitutions of the Brain the Differences of Wit ariſe, as from their proxime Cauſes. All I dare obſerve to You, concerning that *Ænigma*, is only this; that for the moſt part Men of hot and ſanguine Conſtitutions, *cæteris paribus*, are more ingenious and acute; and thoſe of cold, groſs and Phlegmatick, are more dull and ſlow of Imagination. If for this You require *Authority*, I can alledge that of *Hippocrates* himſelf,

himself, who hath two texts expresly favourable and pertinent to the same: one concerning the *Sanguine*; the other, the *Phlegmatick* Temperament. The first is this; Πυρὸς τὸ ὑγρότατον, καὶ ὕδατος τὸ ξηρότατον, κρῆσιν λαβόντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φρονιμώτατα: *quod humidissimum est in igne, & siccissimum in aqua, si in corpore temperamentum acceperint, sapientissima sunt.* Περὶ Διαίτης *lib.* 1. *sect.* 29. The other, this; Εἰ δέ τινι ἐνδεεστέρως ἡ δύναμιν τὸ πῦρ λάβοι τοῦ ὕδατος, βραδυτέρην ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι καὶ καλέονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἠλίθιοι: *porro si in aliqua Anima defectuosiorem vim ignis accipiat quàm aqua, eam tardiorem esse necesse est; & appellantur tales Stolidi.* Ibidem *Sect.* 32. If *Reason*; it is obvious, that the Blood being the fountain of Natural Heat,

and in truth the only *Calidum innatum*, by which all parts of the body are perpetually warmed, enlivened and invigorated; and out of whose pureſt and agileſt parts the Animal Spirits are ſuppoſed to be extracted: by how much more copious and pure the Blood is, by ſo much more of heat is thence communicated to the Brain and its Appendix of Nerves (thereby made more firm and apt both to receive and retain the Images or impreſſions of external Objects; and more pervious to the Animal ſpirits) and a greater ſupply of Spirits generated out of it, for the uſes of the Animal Faculties therein reſiding, and thereon depending, and *è contra*. Hence doubtleſs it was, that *Empedocles*

held

held the Blood to be both the ſeat and cauſe of *Sapience*: and that Dr. *Harvey*, ſomewhere in his Book of the *Generation of Animals*, affirms it to be of no ſmall advantage to the Brain, that Students and contemplative Men preſerve their maſs of Blood pure and uncorrupt.

But I remember that my preſent task belongs rather to *Morals* than to *Phyſick*, and therefore ſuperſeding all further enquiry concerning the diverſity of conſtitutions from whence the diverſity of Wits may ariſe; and remitting You to the ſerious conſideration of what that Excellent Man, Mr. *Hobbes* hath delivered (*lib. de Homine, cap.* 13.) concerning the *Mutation* of Mens In-

genies by Paſſions, Cuſtome, Experience, the goods of Fortune, Opinion of ones ſelf, *&c.* I paſs to the principal *Differences* themſelves, and their Deſcriptions; which animated by Your Command, I propoſed to my ſelf chiefly to handle in this haſty exerciſe of my blunt and unequal Pen.

## SECT. V.

### ART. 1.

TO go about to deſcribe the great variety of *Ingenies* among Men, though of but one and the ſame Nation, were an attempt equally vain with his, who ſhould endeavour to number the Sands; nor leſs impoſſible than for a Painter to pourtrey

pourtrey all the ſeveral faces in an Army upon one table. As it is ſufficient, therefore, to a well-drawn Landskip, to contain the moſt eminent hills, buildings, trees and other objects ſituate in the proſpect of the Eye within that Horizon: ſo may it be ſome ſatisfaction to You, if among a vaſt number of different Wits I ſelect the moſt *Eminent*, ſuch as appear to be the ſprings or Sources of many Virtues, and not fewer Vices; and then repreſent them in Colours ſo ſuitable to their ſeveral Natures, that You may be able to diſcern and diſtinguiſh each from the reſt, notwithſtanding the neer affinity and reſemblance, which ſome of them have with others. I call them the Sources of many *Virtues* and *Vices*;

becauſe this may paſs for a Maxime, *Ingenia quando aſſueſcendo ita confirmata ſunt, ut facilè, nec reluctante ratione, ſuas edant actiones, dicuntur Mores: qui ſi boni ſunt, Virtutes; ſin mali, Vitia appellantur.*

ART. 2.

To addreſs then to their Deſcriptions. That which occurs in the firſt place is the READY or nimble *Wit*. Wherewith ſuch as are endowed have a certain Extemporary acuteneſs of conceipt, accompanied with a quick delivery of their thoughts, ſo as they can at pleaſure entertain their Auditors with facetious paſſages, and fluent diſcourſes even upon very light occaſions. They have indeed much of that Ἀγχίνοια

ſive

*ſive habilitas in promptu excogitandi quid dicto ſit opus*, formerly deſcribed; and are therefore excellent at ſuddain *Repartés*: but being generally impatient of ſecond thoughts and Deliberation, they ſeem fitter for pleaſant *Colloquies* and *Drollery*, than for *Counſel* and *Deſign*. Like Fly-boats, good only in fair weather and ſhallow waters: and then too more for pleaſure, than traffick. If they be, as for the moſt part they are, narrow in the Hold, and deſtitute of Ballaſt ſufficient to counterpoize their large Sails; they reel with every blaſt of Argument, and are often driven upon the ſands of a *Non-plus*: but where favoured with the breath of common Applauſe, they ſail ſmoothly and proudly, and, like

the City Pageants, discharge whole Volleys of Squibbs and Crackers, and skirmish most furiously.

ART. 3.

Of these You meet with *two* sorts. *Some* carry away the bell in Table-talk and familiar conversation, with short, but piquant touches of Phansie, such as playes chiefly upon the defects or misfortunes of others in the company, yet without gall: their teeth are sharp, but not venemous: and they rather nibble, than bite. *Others*, approaching nearer to the dignity of Eloquence, are provided, whenever they please to imploy their talent, either in publick or private,

vate, to ſpeak volubly, and to the purpoſe; yet not ſo much from ſolidity of Judgement; as ſtrength of *Memory*, which inſtantly ſupplies them with whatever they have heard or read agreeable to their Theme. The fine deſcants and poinant remarks of both ſorts are commonly admired not only by ignorant Ears, but alſo by ſome of Scholaſtick Erudition; who obſerving the facility of their vein in breaking ſharp jeſts, and pouring forth a torrent of not undecent expreſſions, are apt to grow out of love with themſelves, and to be offended with their own flowneſs of Conception, which permits them not to do the like without premeditation and pumping. And they have

have reason. For, what can You imagine more specioully resembling true industry, and gracefull Elocution, than the opportune and pertinent *Hitts* of those facetious Spirits? what more Elegant, than to make acute reflections upon every occurrent; and to give home-touches with gentleness; which are the less resented, because they appear suddain and jocular? If to this *Promptness* and *Jocundity* of Wit, either Nature hath been so liberal as to add comeliness of *Person*, or Fortune so propitious as to conjoyn dignity of *Condition*; especially if it be animated by great and secure *Confidence*: then is their liberty of jesting as it were authorized in all places, nor ungrateful to those whom it

it provokes: yea oftentimes, by its very *Galliardiſe*, it wins the Palm from ſolid and exact *Prudence*, if lodged in Men of excellent abilities, but ſlow Expreſſion. Of the advantages redounding to a ready Wit from that Gracefulneſs of Perſon, which the Grecians termed Τὸ σεμνοπρεπὲς τῦ προσώπυ, and the Latins, *dignitas oris*; You have an eminent Example in *Dion* the *Syracuſan*, who thereby much ingratiating himſelf to the people, was ſo proſperous in his ambition, that he ruined *Dionyſius*, and ſucceeded him in the Soveraignty of *Sicily*: and *Corn. Nepos* puts the ſame in his Character; where among his natural Endowments he reckons as chief, *ingenium docile & come*; *magnamq; corporis*

*corporis dignitatem, quæ non minimum commendatur.*

ART. 4.

But this ſo charming ſwiftneſs of both Phanſie and Tongue is not exempt from its *Failings*, and thoſe ſhamefull ones too ſometimes. For, take them from their familiar and private converſation, into grave and ſevere Aſſemblies, whence all extemporary flaſhes of Wit, all Phantaſtick alluſions, all Perſonal reflections are excluded; and there engage them in an Encountre with ſolid *Wiſdom*, not in light skirmiſhes, but a pitcht field of long and ſerious debate concerning any important queſtion: and then You ſhall ſoon diſcover their weakneſs,

weakneſs, and contemn that barrenneſs of underſtanding which is uncapable of ſtruggling with the difficulties of Apodictical knowledge, and the deduction of truth from a long *ſeries* of Reaſons. Again, if thoſe very conciſe ſayings, and lucky *Repartés* (for the Court hath now naturaliz'd that Word) wherein they are ſo happy, and which at firſt hearing were entertained with ſo much of pleaſure and admiration; be written down, and brought to a ſtrict examination of their *Pertinency*, *Coherence* and *Verity*: how ſhallow, how frothy, how forced will they be found! how much will they loſe of that Applauſe, which their tickling of the ear, and preſent flight through the Imagination had gain'd! In the greateſt part

part therefore of such Men You ought to expect no deep and continued River of Wit; but only a few *Plashes*, and those too not altogether free from mudd and putrefaction.

## SECT. VII.

### ART. I.

IN the second place comes the RANGING Wit, whose Pregnancy is so diffused, that it flies at all things; and commonly assisted with prolix Eloquence, discourseth copiously rather than closely; without premeditation supplying it self with words and sentences, as out of a treasury inexhaustible. Men of this Talent

lent are uſually in high eſteem with the People, if of ſuch Profeſſions as give them opportunities to ſhew their Copiouſneſs in publick Aſſemblies or Councils: nor ungrateful in private Converſation, at leaſt when once they have learned as well to be ſilent at ſome times, as to ſpeak profuſely at others. Which they cannot eaſily do. For, as all Brute Animals know, by natural inſtinct, in what part their chief power lies, and delight in the frequent uſe of that part above all the reſt of their members: ſo theſe Men, highly delighted with their faculty of Eloquence, wherein alone they excell, are hardly brought to obſerve *Decorum*, and opportunities when to contract or expatiate;

ate, when to ſpeak or hold their peace; but carryed violently on by an itch of declaiming on every ſubject, how trivial or impertinent ſoever, often entangle themſelves in Arguments above their underſtanding, and ſo ſatiate, but not ſatisfie their Hearers. So that even a Wiſe man may juſtly wonder, their imprudence conſidered, how they are able to ſpeak ſo much and ſo little at once, ſo well and to ſo little purpoſe. Having at length ended (not finiſhed) their fine *Harangues*, they ſcarcely refrain from openly applauding themſelves: and if their Auditors ſhew any ſigns of Complacency and good Humour, they are apt to refer it only to a ſatisfaction of judgement reſulting from the

Elegancy

Elegancy of their diſcourſes, though the ſame ariſeth rather from Joy that they are at length delivered from the importunity of them. Notwithſtanding this Vanity it muſt be confeſſed, theſe Wits have long wings, and incited by a ſecret *impetus* of Nature, delight to flye abroad, and range over the whole field of *Sciences*: but then again ſuch is their ſpeed and præcipitancy, they ſtay no where long enough to *examine*, *ſelect* and *gather*; like Bees in a windy day, they take only a ſuperficial taſte of various flowers, and return to their hives unloaded. Whence it comes, that while they are diſcourſing of one part of Learning, if a new hint chance to ariſe and intrude it ſelf into their Imagina-

tion, inſtantly quitting their former Theme, they as ardently purſue the new one; and ſo often divert to freſh Arguments, till they have wholly forgotten the queſtion firſt ſtarted; as unſtanch Hounds, meeting with a new ſcent, follow it with full cry, and loſe the Beaſt firſt chaſed. And this is that *Defect* of *Mind*, which is commonly called *Levity*: ariſing perhaps chiefly from an exceſſive *Mobility* of the Animal ſpirits in the ſeat of *Imagination*.

No wonder, then, if theſe *Rambling* Heads be ſo far from attaining to ſublime and extraordinary Wiſdom, that for the moſt part they come ſhort of even Vulgar ones in ordering their

their affairs according to the rules of *Domeſtick Prudence*. Some of them becloud themſelves with the Vapours of *Philauty*, ſelf-love, and over-valuation of their own Opinions, and hunting after Praiſe: Others loſe their credit by too-viſible *Affectation*: Others attempt things above their reach, and ſink themſelves by aſpiring: and Moſt prove wanting to themſelves and Friends in ſuch offices, where conſtant *ſedulity*, and ſteady adherence to one purpoſe is required. For, they are naturally light, unconſtant even to their own Hopes, variable in their Deſigns, fixt to nothing but their own Opinions, in which they ſo abſolutely confide, that they look not into the advantages of

others propoſals and counſels. And yet for all this ſome of them ſo dazel weaker Eyes with the poliſh and luſtre of their ſuperficial Parts, that they paſs for Accompliſhed Perſons, and are at length admitted to reap that harveſt of Fame and Wealth, which ought to be the reward of ſolid and profound Abilities: eſpecially when they have acquired the Art of underſtanding as well how to *conceal* their *Defects*, as how to ſet forth their good Qualities.

ART. 2.

This Art conſiſteth principally in moderating their fervency of ſpeaking; in frequent change of Arguments; and alwayes chooſing

chooſing ſuch, in which they may moſt eaſily impoſe upon their Hearers. For inſtance; among *Military* men, let them diſcourſe of matters of *Religion*, of the rites and cuſtoms of the Ancients, of the Origines and Migrations of Nations, and ſuch like Themes, wherein Souldiers generally have but little knowledge, among men bred up in the ſhades of the *Schools*, and unconverſant in Polities; let them diſcourſe of the foundations and periods of Empires, of the Fates of Kingdoms, of the revolutions in Commonwealths, of the Virtues and great actions of particular Princes, of State Maxims, *&c.* In a word, *Let them provoke none in his own Way or Art.* For, in familiar conferences, and ſo-

ciable Colloquies, it is not ungrateful, ſo it be dextrouſly done, to divert to things of which the Company is ignorant: both becauſe Errours then eſcape diſcovery, and becauſe Novelty begets pleaſure, and by how much more we eſteem things of which we never heard before, by ſo much more do we admire him who delivered them. But above all *let them take heed of Writing*; which to Roving and Superficial Wits is as difficult, as their Gift of ſpeaking fluently is eaſie, and for the moſt part proves no leſs deſtructive to their Fame, than their *ex tempore* Oratory hath been favourable. For, that which gives due ſharpneſs and grace to the *Stile* of a *Writter*, and recommends it to the preſent

and

and ſucceeding Ages, is exquiſite and elaborate *Judgement*; which is very rarely conjoyn'd with natural fluency of ſpeech. The *Reaſon* may be this; that a prompt, but turbulent Mind, when in retirement (which all know to be neceſſary to a Writer) it comes once to reflect upon it ſelf, and examine its own ſtrength; burdened with multiplicity of things together offering themſelves, and confounded with variety of thoughts, ſoon faints under the weight: and having neither judgement to *ſelect*, nor patience to *digeſt*, falls at length into Diſtraction, or Deſpondency. In fine, the Faculty of writing well is ſo different from that of talking volubly, and requires ſo

much more of both Attention and Deliberation; that moſt of your *Fine Speakers*, when once they find the wings of their Phanſie clipt, and their underſtanding intangled in ſtrong and knotty Reaſonings, are miſerably at a loſs how to extricate themſelves, and deſpairing of ſucceſs, return to their former liberty. Yet ſome of this *Claſsis*, either blinded with ſelf-conceit, or deluded by adulation of their Admirers, have adventured to publiſh Books; and out of vain Ambition to enlarge and eternize their Reputation by their Pen, have utterly ruined what they had acquired by the nimbleneſs of their Tongue. My advice, therefore, to ſuch ſhall be this; that they raiſe

in

in the World an Expectation of ſome conſiderable Volume from them, and keep that expectation alive as long as they can: but be ſo wiſe as never to ſatisfie it with ſo much as a ſingle Sheet. But Wits of this temper are commonly too Hot to moderate their Efforts; too opinionated to take caution from the Counſel of even their trueſt Friends: and therefore I leave them to pleaſe themſelves.

## SECT. VII.

### ART. 1.

YOu have beheld the Ready, and the Roving Wits, together with their Advantages and

and Defects; be pleased now to remove Your eye to the Image of a *Third* sort, which seeming contrary to both, and yet more usefull than either, may therefore not unfitly be called the SLOW, but SURE Wit. Some Heads there are of a certain close and reserved Constitution, which makes them at first sight to promise as little of the Virtues wherewith they are endowed, as the former appear to be above the Imperfections to which they are subject. Somewhat *Slow* they are indeed of both *Conception* and *Expression*; yet no whit the less comparated to *solid Prudence*. When they are ingaged to speak, their Tongue doth not readily interpret the dictates of their Mind; so that their Language

guage comes as it were dropping from their lipps, even where they are encouraged by familiar entreaties, or provoked by the ſmartneſs of jeſts, which ſuddain and nimble Wits have newly darted at them. Coſtive they are alſo in their *Invention*; ſo that when they would deliver ſomewhat ſolid and remarkable, they are long in ſeeking what is fit, and as long in determining in what manner and words to utter it. But, after a little conſideration, they penetrate deeply into the ſubſtance of things, and marrow of buſineſs, and conceive proper and Emphatick words, by which to expreſs their Sentiments. *Barren* they are not, but a little *Heavy* and *Retentive*. Their Gifts lye deep

deep and concealed; being furniſhed with Notions, not aëry and umbratil ones, borrowed from the Pedantiſm of the *Schools*, but true and uſefull: and if they have been manured with good Learning, and the habit of exerciſing their Pen; oftentimes they produce many excellent Conceptions worthy to be tranſmitted to Poſterity.

ART. 2.

Though they have no reaſon to accuſe Nature of any unkindneſs to them; yet they have juſt cauſe to complain of the iniquity of *Fortune*, in this reſpect; that having an Aſpect very like to narrow and dull Capacities, at firſt ſight moſt Men take

take them to be really ſuch, and ſtrangers look upon them with the eyes of neglect and contempt. Hence it comes, that Excellent Parts remaining unknown, often want the favour and patronage of Great Perſons, whereby otherwiſe they might be redeemed from obſcurity, and raiſed to imployments anſwerable to their Faculties, and crowned with honours proportionate to their Merits: as the moſt precious wares ſeldom invite buyers, if kept in darkſome corners, nor decently expoſed, and adorned with ſplendid titles.

ART. 3.

The beſt courſe, therefore, for

for these to overcome that Eclipse, which prejudice usually brings upon them, is *to contend against their own Modesty*, and either by frequent converse with noble and discerning spirits, to enlarge the Windows of their Minds, and dispel those clouds of Reservedness, that darken the lustre of their Faculties: or by *Writing* on some new and usefull subject, to lay open their Talent, that so the World may be convinced of their intrinsick value.

SECT.

## SECT. VIII.

### ART. 1.

IN the middle betwixt the two Oppoſites, too much Heavineſs, and too much Lightneſs, Nature ſeems to have placed the moſt happy *Indoles* or AMPLE Wit: which is ſeldom out of love with it ſelf, yet never too indulgent to it ſelf, and often advanceth its poſſeſſors to the higheſt honours and dignities, of which Subjects are capable. This uſually is attended with no more of *Eloquence* than decency allows, or occaſion requires; and that, if cultivated by Erudition, or matured by Time, is always neat and graceſull

full even in familiar Converſation; neither precipitate, nor ſlow in delivery: as guided by a Judgement, though not ſharp on the ſuddain, yet ſtrong and ſolid after a little recollection. In fine, this is the Man moſt fit to harbour all Virtues; as by Natures benignity comparated to great *Prudence*, as well *Publick* as *Private*: and if toucht with a Temperamental Propenſity to ſome certain Vice, yet ſeldom tainted with any evil *Habit*.

ART. 2.

Betwixt theſe *Ample Wits* and the *Narrow* ones, Nature her ſelf hath a certain *Criterion* or Character of Diſtinction, eaſily diſcernable: and it is this. The *Former*,

*Former*, being duly conſcious of their own dignity, do all things with a *Bon Mine* or good Grace; and becoming *Freedom*, far from the vices of Affectation and Conſtrained Formality: as being actuated by Spirits not bold, but *Generous* and Erect, alwayes addreſſed to noble Ends, and contemplating ſomewhat diffuſive and above vulgar aims. And this is that Semi-divine Temper of the Mind, which *Ariſtotle* calls Εὐφυΐα, the Latins, *Felicitas ingenii*; and we, an *Univerſal Capacity*. On the contrary, *Narrow* and *Groveling* Wits condemn themſelves to abject Cogitations and low Counſels, never daring to aſpire above the common ſuggeſtions of their puſillanimous Humility: yet in little

matters, and ſuch as tranſcend not the Sphere of their Capacity, they often proceed with exact diligence, and ſometimes alſo with good ſucceſs; there being annexed to them a certain *Aſtutia*, ſiniſtre or ſpurious Wiſdome called *Cunning and Wiſdom for ones ſelf*, ſuch as is common alſo to weak and timorous Animals, which keeps them intent wholly upon their own ſafety, and (as we have before deduced it) ariſeth only from *diffidence of ſufficiency in themſelves*; than which there can be no greater Enemy to noble and generous Undertakings. Beſides, if they at any time (as ſometimes, puft up with proſperity of their Crafty and undermining deſigns, they will) offer at ingenuity;

genuity; it is with ſo much conſtraint, formality and ſtarch'dneſs, that they expoſe themſelves to the ſmiles and contempt of Judicious Men.

ART. 3.

This *Thau* or Mark of difference is well worthy Your obſervation, becauſe theſe *Half-witted* or *Cunning* Men for the moſt part make advantage of even their Inability, building rather upon deceiving others, who confide in them, than upon any ſoundneſs of their own proceedings: and becauſe (as the *Lord Chancellor Bacon* moſt judiciouſly obſerves) *nothing doth*

*more harm in a State, than that Cunning men paſs for Wiſe men*; like *Empiricks* in *Phyſick*, they may indeed have a great Collection of Experiments, but not knowing the right and ſeaſonable uſe of them, pervert them to baſe and ſiniſter Ends.

Leaving them therefore as unworthy further conſideration, let us return to our *Bon. Eſprit*, and for a few minutes entertain our ſelves with contemplating the excellency thereof.

ART. 4.

There are among the *Literati*, who miſled either by too much favour to their own *Diſciplines*, or by an immoderate eſteem of the advantages

advantages of *Scholaſtick Sciences* (which were never denyed to be very great by any but the Barbarous) allow no Wit to be *Happy* and of *Publick uſe*, but that which is not only capable of, but alſo naturally addicted to *Letters*; none to have attained to the juſt height of Prudence, that was not advanced thereto by the Scale of various *Learning*. Thus Men eminently fruitful in Publick Virtues, and as it were conſtellated for *Politie* or the great Art of Governing the Multitude, they exclude from the Senate, and from true Greatneſs, by a Prejudice more allyed to Envy than to Diſcretion. For,

ART. 5.

On the contrary, it is much more reaſonable to hold, that none are ſo fit for affairs of *State*, as thoſe bleſt Favourites of Nature, upon whom ſhe hath accumulated her nobleſt and richeſt Donatives: Since that *Sagacity* of *Spirit* which enableth a Man not only to know the Reſorts and Opportunities of Buſineſs; but alſo to ſink into the Main of it; and then to form Counſels both for *Conduct* and *Diſpatch* (the two Principal Virtues in a *States-man*) is rather the free Gift of Heaven, than the purchaſe of Labour and Study. Which ſeems to be no more than what the great *Roman Orator* averrs,

averrs, upon his own obſervation. *Ego multos homines* (ſaith he) *in Orat. pro Archia Poëta*) *excellenti animo ac virtute fuiſſe, & ſine doctrina, naturæ ipſius habitu propè divino, per ſeipſos & moderatos & graves extitiſſe fateor: & illud adjungam, ſæpius ad laudem, atq; Virtutem naturam ſine doctrina, quàm ſine natura valuiſſe doctrinam.* Again, Time hath furniſhed us with Examples of ſome, who had acquired high eſtimation in the Schools by extraordinary acuteneſs in ſundry kinds of Learning, and yet proved very weak, when they were tranſplanted into the more ſubtile and fine region of Princes Courts and Councils: their Reaſon then confeſſing it ſelf too dull-ſighted to diſcern the Fineſſes

of Civil Prudence, to which all other Learning muſt give place.

You will not, *Sir*, I preſume, be long in determining which is the truer *Wiſdom*, his, who can foreſee diſcontents and Motions of a Nation, and provide ſeaſonable and ſafe Remedies for them; or his, who, after long contemplation, is able to predict Eclipſes of the Sun and Moon, and to calculate the journeys and returns of all the Planets; but cannot preſage what dangers threaten the Commonwealth, what Changes and Revolutions are impendent over the State.

Beſides, thoſe very Men, who thus cry up the uſefulneſs of

*Languages*

*Languages* and *Sciences*, reſtrain not the title of *Learned* and *Polite* to him alone, who hath with equal felicity run through the whole *Encyclopedie* or Round of Arts and Sciences: but think it ſufficient, if a Man acquire excellency in any *one* of them: for inſtance, if an *Orator* ſingularly dextrous in managing Arguments, and happy in all the Exornations of ſpeech, be yet dull and heavy in comprehending the ſecrets of *Natural Philoſophy*; or if a profound *Philoſopher* be yet deſtitute of Eloquence, or unconverſant in *Hiſtory*, and *Politicks* and other parts of Learning; they nevertheleſs deny him not the Honour of an Eminent Wit. That Prehemineence therefore, which is due from any one part of Learning, why

why are they ſo partial, ſo unjuſt, as to detract from that Science, which is converſant in the regulation of whole Societies of Men, and which in that very reſpect ought to be preferred to all other Human Knowledge? Think they, that Wiſdom ſpeaks to her Diſciples only in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or *Hebrew*; and not rather in a ſecret *Vivacity* of *Spirit*, and a piercing Judgement or Reaſon that underſtands all Languages? To be born with a pregnant Wit, is no ſuch high indulgence of Nature, if no more be required therein, than a Propenſion to, and Capacity of Erudition Scholaſtick. Thoſe of the *Ancients*, whom we acknowledge to have been the *Patriarchs* of Sciences, and great Examples of Wiſdom, never

never consumed much of oyl and sweat in the shades of the *Schools*: and yet certainly they were born under Stars highly propitious. To found Republicks, to make wholsome Laws for conservation of publick Peace, to support their Countrey by wise Counsels, to observe the Constitutions, Rites and Customs of other Nations, and transferr into their own whatever they found worthy imitation; so far to note and register the motions of Cœlestial Bodies, as to keep a a true account of Time, and accommodate their negotiations both at home and abroad to the most convenient seasons of the year, and benefit of the People: *This*, this was chiefly called *Science* in those elder and purer Times.

To

To be a little more particular; while thoſe Primitive Sages laboured to reclaim ſavage and rude Multitudes, and mollifie their iron Minds by manſuetude and other Virtues, neceſſary to common ſafety and the maintenance of Right in Civil Societies; by little and little there grew up that Knowledge, which is called *Moral* Philoſophy. And while, being disjoyned by mutual emulation and contention, they endevoured to perſwade the People to favour and adhere to one or the other ſide, they made ſpeeches to them to move their Affections accordingly; that gave the firſt beginning and credit to *Eloquence* or *Oratory*. In a word, the Monuments of Hiſtory have conveyed

conveyed down to us the Prudence and Artifices of thoſe Ancients, ſo as to be Precedents to our Modern *Literati*; at leaſt if they be able to bear the like weight of cares: if not, the beſt uſe their weaker Heads can make of ſuch Monuments, will be only to boaſt of their Reading, by ſhewing them to others; as Prieſts ſhew Reliques of Saints, but want the power of working Miracles; or as keepers of antick and magnificent Structures can perhaps name the Founders and Architects, but imitate neither. For, to read Hiſtory only for Contemplation, is a vain and idle pleaſure, that leaves no fruit behind: but to imitate the glorious actions and atchievements of ſuch worthy Patriots, that's

true

true and noble *Erudition*. This was the uſe *Cicero* made of his vaſt readings, as appears by that profeſſion of his (*in Orat. pro Archia Poëta.*) *Quàm multas nobis imagines, non ſolùm ad intuendum, verum etiam ad imitandum, fortiſſimorum hominum expreſſas Scriptores & Græci & Latini reliquerunt? quas Ego mihi ſemper in adminiſtranda Rep. proponens, Animum & mentem meam ipſa cogitatione Virorum excellentium conformabam*, &c.

## Art. 6.

Nevertheleſs it is not to be doubted, but the moſt *Abſolute* Wit is that, which (like the *Firſt Matter* of the *Ariſtoteleans*) is capable of any *Form*, and can with equal facility employ it ſelf in all kinds

kinds of Studies; having an Universal Acuteneſs, and ſtrength as well to graſp the difficult and ſlippery Myſteries of State, as to unravel the knotty Methods of Arts and Sciences profeſſed in Univerſities. For, Studies perfect Nature; and both are perfected by Experience: natural Abilities being like Fruit-trees, that need proyning and culture by learning; and Studies themſelves giving forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded by Experience. All together make the happieſt conjunction, and by mutual aſſiſtance advance their Owner to the pinnacle of Humane Wiſdom and Honour: that ſublime Sagaicty of judgement requiſite in a *States-man*, and conformed to the

the *Genius* of the preſent Age, and comporting with the conſtitution of Affairs; ſo governing Learning, as that it can neither degenerate into *Pedantiſm*, nor ruſt in vain and ſolitary *Speculation*: and Learning, on the other ſide, ſo ſupporting and enriching the Judgement, as that it need not rely only upon ſingle Experience and Obſervation of its own time, but may have recourſe alſo to the Oracles of all former Ages, and furniſh it ſelf with Examples out of the treaſury of Antiquity.

Yet if any Man (as many ſuch there are) naturally addicted to Publick buſineſs, and fit to ſerve his Prince and Countrey in quality of a Counſellor, be not equally

equally in favour with the *Muses*, nor prosperous in Scholastick speculations; I hope, *Sir*, You will not stick to allow him to be a Person of a more erect Mind, and nobler Parts, than a meer Contemplative Book-man; who though perhaps skilfull in Languages, and Logician enough to unriddle and impose Sophisms, and to dispute long and formally about *Non-entities*, is yet too narrow of understanding to measure the vastness of *Civil Prudence*, which is founded upon mature observation, and built up of solid Experiences, squar'd by exact Judgement, and adjusted to present Emergencies in State. So that I am apt to believe, that *Favorinus* was in very good earnest, though he seemed to jest,

when he measured the Knowledge of *Adrian* the Emperour by the greatness of his Power. The story is in short this. *Adrian*, not a little ambitious of the fame of extraordinary Learning, accidentally meeting *Favorinus*, an eminent Philosopher, fell instantly upon him with a whole Volley of Syllogisms, and pressed him with Sophistical Arguments: to which the wary Philosopher made but sparing and modest answers, such as intimated his being overcome, and left the Emperour to please himself with his imaginary victory. Soon after, to his Friends reprehending him for making so weak defence, he returned this vindication: *I were to blame* (said he) *if I should not grant him to be the*

*moſt learned, who hath daily twenty Legions at his command.* Which I underſtand to be more than a Complement; the Regiment of ſo many Millions being a piece of greater skill, and ſublimer Science, than to manage a diſputation with Dialectical ſubtlety, and argue in Mode and Figure.

Having thus in a ſhort digreſſion, endeavoured to refute the Error of ſuch who hold, that no Wit, however Ample and Happy in its native capacity, can yet attain to ſolid Prudence, without the improvement of Scholaſtick Erudition: it follows, that we obſerve briefly both the *Vice*, to which even the Beſt tempered Wits ſometimes are prone; and the principal *Remedy* thereof.

ART. 7.

As Pusillanimity or Self-diffidence makes of Narrow Wits Cunning men: so *Self-confidence*, if immoderate, often checks the growth, and hinders the fertility of even the Best Wits. For, some of greatest hopes, too soon trusting to the native pregnancy of their Mind, and desisting from Lecture, Meditation and all other labour of the Brain, as not only unnecessary, but also burdensome, and expensive of time: thereby clipp their own wings, render themselves unfit for any generous slight, and ever after flagg; so far from aspiring above others, that they come short even of themselves, and suffering

ſuffering thoſe *igniculi ætherei* or Cœleſtial ſparks of Wit, by which they were in their Youth actuated, to languiſh and go out for want of induſtry to fan them, degenerate into a barren dulneſs, ſo much the more difficult to be overcome, by how much the longer ere acknowledged. Whereas *Others*, conſcious of their native imbecillity, endeavour with labour and ſweat to acquire what the auſterity of Nature denyed them; and by continual culture of Study, and ſeeds of good Diſcipline, ſo enrich the field of their Underſtanding, that at length they exceed in fertility of Science not only their former ſelves, but others alſo to whom Nature hath been much more boun-

tiful. By which it is manifeſt, that,

ART. 8.

The proper Remedy for this Obſtruction, that not ſeldom brings an *Atrophy* or defect of nouriſhment upon the beſt tempered Wit, can be no other but conſtant *Study* and *Meditation*, by which the Faculties of the Mind are exerciſed and kept in vigour. Not that it is requiſite Men of this order ſhould over-curiouſly ſearch into each *punctilio* or nicety of the thing they contemplate: for, though that be the way to attain exactneſs in ſome *Particulars*; yet it would at the ſame time greatly retard their progreſs in the *Main*, and make it long before

fore they advance ſo far, as to make a liberal and genuine inſpection into the whole of that very Science, which they ſo ambitiously affect. Beſides the ſame would habituate them to confine their Cogitations within too narrow a compaſs; by impaling their Curioſity upon Notions, though perhaps of great ſubtlety in ſpeculation, yet of little uſe in the occurrents of life: nor could they eaſily let looſe their thoughts to other things, which though ſometimes of an inferiour nature, yet may be more neceſſary to be look't into. To theſe therefore I am bold to preſcribe Study as a daily *Exerciſe*, not as their ſole imployment.

ART. 9.

Nor do I condemn those *Fine Wits*, that spend most upon the Stock of Nature; because they have this for excuse, *That all Heads are not equally disposed to patience in Study, and diuturnity of labour.* For, the finer and acuter the Wit is, by so much the more easily indeed doth it penetrate into things difficult, and divide things involved; but then again it grows the sooner blunt with length of labour and intention. The Reason perhaps is this; that Nature doth rarely commit such Fine Wits to the custody of gross and robust Bodies; but for the most part chooseth to lodge them in delicate and tender Constitutions, such

ſuch as produce the pureſt and ſublimeſt ſpirits: which as by their greater Mobility they conduce to quickneſs of Apprehenſion; ſo are they for the ſame cauſe more prone to Expence or Exhauſtion, upon continued intention of the Mind, nor capable of reparation unleſs after due repoſe and pleaſant divertiſement. Again, not only the Labour of theſe Ethereal Wits, but even their *Relaxation* and *Leaſure* is therefore precious; becauſe no ſooner are their Brains at liberty, but they acquire new Vigour, and their Acuteneſs ſpontaneouſly ranging abroad, brings in freſh Hints, and repleniſhes them with ſerious reflections, and uſeful cogitations; as rich ground, when left a while fallow,

fallow, of its own accord puts forth abundance of Excellent Plants, in nothing inferiour to the best cultivated Gardens. This seems pathetically expresst in that Apothegm of *Cosmus de Medicis*, the Politick Founder of the flourishing Dukedome of *Florence*. When in a morning he had lain long in bed, as wholly resigned up to an incurious repose, one of his Favourites coming into his Bed-chamber, salutes him with this Complement; *Sir*, (said he) *where is* Cosmus *the Great, to whose Vigilance, as to a Pilot, we have all entrusted the conduct of our State? are not his eyes open at high noon? I have been abroad some hours since, and dispatched much business.* The *Duke* smartly returns; *boast not Your diligence thus, Sir; my very*

*very Repoſe is more profitable, than all Your pains and induſtry.*

ART. 10.

Nor is this Delicacy of Conſtitution, which hinders the Choiceſt Wits from undergoing the hardſhip of conſtant Study and long watchings, ſo Univerſal, but that ſome are exempted from it. But theſe are, I confeſs, very rare, and as the nobleſt Preſents Nature can make to Kingdoms and States, ſeldom produced by her: being of that moſt happy temper, that they can ſtoop their lofty Parts to the anxiety of tedious Meditations, and drudgery of vaſt Readings and Collections. To this they bring themſelves chiefly by *Reſolution* and *Cuſtom*:

*Custom*: whose Effects are no less admirable in the Faculties of the Mind, than in those of the Body. Hence our incomparable Mr. *Hobbes* (who was pleased not long since to tell me, that he was in the fortieth Year of his age, when he first began to study with due intention of Mind) speaking of the power of Custome upon the various Ingenies of Men, hath this remarkable sentence: *Quæ nova offendunt, eadem sæpius iterata naturam subigunt; & primo quidem ferre se, mox autem amare cogit. Id quod in regimine corporis maximè, deinde etiam in operationibus Animi perspicuum est. de natur. Homin. cap.* 13. *sect.* 3. When they have thus conquered themselves, then it is they make the truly Brave Men. When Time,

Time, Perſeverance in Study, and Experience have brought them to Maturity; You may worthily call them Living Libraries, walking Epitomes of all Sciences, and Magazins of Knowledge. For, in them may be found the Piety of *Divines*, the Wiſdom of *Hiſtories*, the Wit of *Poëts*, the Solidity of the *Mathematicks*, the depth of *Natural Philoſophy*, the Gravity and Uprightneſs of *Moral*, the warineſs of *Logick*, the ſtrength and ſweetneſs of *Rhetorick*, the diſtinguiſhing ſubtlety of the *School-men*, the Exactneſs of *Criticks*, and the right *Uſe* of all. And when they are fix in Publick imployments, *abeunt Studia in mores*, they become fit to bare a continual load of cares; not prone to be confounded with

with Multiplicity of affairs, nor diſcompoſed with the divers aſpects of Occurrents, nor ſtartled at unexpected and croſs Events; but conſtantly calm, and equally ſedulous, and what more can be expected from Humane frailty?

In this rude Draught of the charming Beauties of the *Ample* and *Studious* Wit, more of art might have been ſhewn, and better Colours uſed. But, conſidering that it contains, *tanquam in compendio*, all the ſeveral *Virtues* that lye diſperſed and ſingle in the precedent ſorts; and that You (*Noble Sir*,) are ſo happy as to need no more lively Image thereof, than what You may daily contemplate (the curtain of

of Your great Modesty withdrawn) by reflecting upon Your *Own*: I thought my self at liberty to run the same over only with light touches, and a hasty Pencil. Which I now remove to a work much less gratefull both to Your Genius and my own, namely the Character of the *Malignant* Wit: which I therefore reserved for the last place, that the Deformity thereof might set off the Beauties of those already described; as *Satyrs* and *Negro's* painted by *fair Ladies* make them appear more amiable.

SECT.

## SECT. IX.

### ART. I.

BY the MALIGNANT Wit, then, I understand that which is indeed quick of Apprehension, but *void of Humanity*: being prone to exercise it self chiefly in re-searching into the Defects, Errors, and even the Infortunes of Others, such especially who by their Virtues have rendred themselves Conspicuous; and to delight in both aggravating and publishing them to their dishonour. Wits of this evil temper may not unfitly be resembled to *Chymical Spirits*, which are subtle and penetrating, but they also *corrode*: and the Spirits by

by which they are actuated, seem to be extracted, not out of the purest parts of their Blood (as other Mens are) but from their *Gall*; as if they desired to verifie the new opinion of *Sylvius de la Boe*, that that bitter and acrimonious Excrement is the Natural Ferment of the Blood, and necessary to not only the Vital, but also the Animal actions, in all living Creatures, in which it is found. Out of Self-conceit, they affect to be thought highly *Ingenious*; because nothing is more neerly allied to *Reason*, the proper good of man, than *Ingenie*: whence that of the Poët, *Qui velit ingenio cedere rarus erit.* Whereupon *Claud. Donatus*, relating how one *Filistus*, a Favourite to *Augustus*, used to cast reproaches upon

*Virgil*, and carp at all he ſaid, even in the Emperours preſence; adds that he did it, *non ut verum dignoſceret, quod Socrates facere conſuevit; ſed ut eruditior videretur.* But conſcious of their own Vices, and ſtudious to conceal them; they endeavour by detraction to make it appear, that others alſo of greater Eſtimation in the World, are tainted with the ſame or greater: as infamous Women generally excuſe their perſonal debaucheries, by incriminating upon their whole Sex, calumniating the moſt chaſt and virtuous, to palliate their own diſhonour. To this baſe end, they rejoyce to expoſe the ſecret faults of men any way *renown'd*: which being no otherwiſe ſo eaſily effected as by the *Pen*, they addict themſelves

themſelves moſtly to *Writing*, among all *Sects* chooſing that of *Criticks*, that ſo under the innocent liberty of *judging*, they may uſurp the moſt pernicious licence of *Cenſuring*. In which inhumane practice they are ſure to make uſe of one, or more of theſe cunning artifices. Having found an opportunity to mention ſome evil, whether true or only ſuſpected, in the Perſon, whoſe Merits they intend to diſparage; either they induſtriouſly pretermit what they know, and ought to conjoyn towards the excuſe thereof; or they pretend (forſooth) not to believe it, when yet they revive the memory of it for no other end, but that it may be more firmly believed by others. Where they meet with notorious

failings, there they ſeem to extenuate, and as it were to compenſate them with ſlight Commendations, only to diſguiſe their detraction: as I have heard of a certain Courtier, who deſirous to obſtruct the preferment of a poor Countrey Vicar, and yet not daring to oppoſe his Maſter, King *James* his charitable inclination thereunto; ſaid to the King, *Your Majeſty may do well to give him a better Living, for though he hath not much of Learning, he is a very good Fellow, too hard for all his Pariſhioners at Cudgels, and hath a ſingular knack in catching Dotrells.* Another of their tricks is this; where they cannot blame the *Fact* it ſelf, they ſuggeſt ſiniſtre *Motives* or inducements to the doing of it, and deprave the *Counſel* and

and intention. To theſe may be added one more, no leſs deteſtable; where rumour hath diſperſed various conjectures concerning one and the ſame action of ſome Eminent Man, omitting or ſuppreſſing the more benign and favourable, they ſelect the *worſe* and more derogatory, and largely comment thereupon; with deſign to pervert the belief of their Hearers, or Readers, *in deteriorem partem*. Thus drawing ſuſpicions from the crooked rule of their own inſincere Mind and depraved inclinations; they labour to perſwade themſelves and others, that there is among Men no ſuch thing as true Virtue, but only a Shadow or artificial repreſentation of it: thereby vainly

promiſing to themſelves the reputation of ſingular acuteneſs of judgement, and more than vulgar Wiſdom. If they can Eclipſe the glory of Worthy Men, by fomenting obſcure and uncertain rumours concerning their Atchievements, or by malitiouſly aſcribing the ſame, not to prudent Counſels and honourable Motives, but to Ambition, or Avarice, or Hypocriſie, or Simulation; or Captation of popular favour, or any the like ſiniſtre aims: they then imagine they have raiſed to themſelves a Monument of Honour out of the ruines of theirs, whom they thus inhumanly calumniate.

ART. 2.

To this *Claſsis* may be referred all the ill-natur'd Diſciples of *Momus*, *Deriſores*, *Scoffers*, ſuch who, like Beetles, ſeem hatch'd in dung, or Vermine bred out of Ulcers; perpetually feeding upon the frailties and imperfections of Human nature. Nor will it be eaſie for *Satyriſts* and *Comical Poets*, thoſe eſpecially of the more licentious and railing ſort, to exempt themſelves from the ſame Tribe. This *Sir*, perhaps You'l think to be a little ſevere: but it is not my judgement alone; for among the ancient *Comical Wits* of *Greece*, You may find more than one deſervedly accuſed, and clearly convicted of

uncivil obtrectation. In one or two of the most famous I shall instance, for justification of what I here say.

*Cratinus*, one of the *Triumvirate*, which first reformed *Comedy* from its primitive rudeness, and began to purge the Stage from obscenity and personal invectives; is nevertheless noted by the Great *Scaliger* (*Poëtices lib.* 1. *cap.* 7.) to have been not only sharply censorious, but bitterly Malignant also, and grosly inurbane: insomuch that at last it cost him his life. For, having in one of his Comedies, intituled Βάτλας (unduly ascribed to *Eupolis*, by *Politian*, *Miscellan. cap.* 10.) too palpably inveighed against, and personated some of eminent Quality,

Quality, and expoſed them to the deriſion of their Fellow-citizens, the *Athenians* (deſcribed by *Ælian* (2. *variar. Hiſtoriar. cap.* 13.) to have been *naturâ invidioſi, & ad detractandum optimis quibuſq; proclives*) he thereby ſo far provoked them, that in revenge they bound him hand and foot, and caſt him into the Sea, in the manner of his Death alluding to the Title of his Play, which ſignifies one *drencht* or *dipp'd* in water. An Example well worthy to be remembred by his Sectators in this uncharitable Age.

ART. 3.

To this *Cratinus* I take liberty to conjoyn another of the ſame Triumvirate, his Equal, the ſo much

much celebrated *Ariſtophanes*: and this I do, as well becauſe of his moſt inhuman perſecution of the Divine *Socrates*, both in that Fable, which he called Νεφέλαι, *the Clouds*, and which he invented only to render that beſt and wiſeſt of Mortals odious to the baſe Vulgar; as becauſe he was one of the Conſpirators againſt his life: being thereto ſuborned partly by private Hate (becauſe *Socrates* frequented and applauded the Tragœdies of *Euripides*, but would hardly be brought to honour with his preſence any one of *Ariſtophanes* his Satyrical Comedies) partly by *Anitus* and *Melitus*, who not long after by falſe accuſations robb'd the innocent Philoſopher of his life, and the world of its richeſt Treaſure.

ſure. Again, all the reſt of *Ariſtophanes* Comedies are more or leſs beſprinkled with the venome of Detraction and Dicacity. It was not then without juſt cauſe, that *Plutarch*, a moſt grave and judicious Philoſopher, in his Comparation of *Ariſtophanes* with *Menander*, among many other Criminations of the former, gives him this Character: *Ariſtophanis Sales amari ſunt & aſperi; acrem & mordentem, adeoq; exulcerantem vim habent.* —— *Nulli enim moderato videtur is homo ſuum poëma ſcripſiſſe, ſed turpia & libidinoſa intemperantibus, maledica & acerba invidis atq; malignis hominibus*, &c. Nor doth that moſt Learned Man, *Nicodemus Friſchlinus*, who wrote his Life, together with a defence of him againſt the

the faults objected by *Plutarch*, vindicate him from inhoneſt Acerbity and Malignity; otherwiſe than by transferring it upon the licentiouſneſs of the Times in which he wrote, and uſe of ancient Comedy: his words are theſe, *Equidem non inficior, rem ita eſſe, ut ille* [Plutarchus] *dicit. Sed vitio temporum illorum potius quàm Poëtæ hoc, quicquid reprehenſionis eſt, aſcribi debet; & ita ferebat Comœdiæ veteris conſuetudo, ut omnia argumenta eſſent ſalſa, feſtiva, mordacia, maledica; nec quicquam diceretur à quoquam, quod non ad perniciem alicujus accommodaretur.* Which You have the more reaſon to believe, becauſe in Your travells You have ſometimes reſided in a certain City, much more populous, under a better Government, and

and more civilized than ever *Athens* was, yea more inhabited by ſuch as make profeſſion of Chriſtianity; in which notwithſtanding that ſcandalous Licence of expoſing well-deſerving and honourable Men upon the publick Stage, and daſhing even Virtue it ſelf out of Countenance, by the ſcurrilous reproaches and mimical actions of Comedians, ſeems to be revived; ſo many Ages after it hath been condemned by Wiſe Princes, polite Nations, and by the beſt of Modern Comical Poëts themſelves, as a thing not only inconſiſtent with Humanity and Chriſtian Charity, but pernicious to the publick peace of Societies, by raiſing diſcontent, animoſities, quarrels and factions. But being

being long ſince returned into your own native Countrey, You are here out of danger of ſuffering by any ſuch undecent licence: our Theatres being regulated by ſtricter Laws, and our Poëts for the moſt part Gentlemen of liberal Education.

In this ſhort reflection upon the *Male-volence* of ſome *Modern Poëts*, I have rather ſtood ſtill a while, than gone out of my way: their Example ſerving no leſs to juſtifie my aſcribing Wits *immoderately Satyrical* to this Order, whereof I am now treating, than thoſe of the *Grecians* I have nam'd. However, that I may haſten to the end of our walk, eſpecially now You are tired with the uneveneſs of the way, and my dull company; I proceed. This

This virulent Humour of *diſgracing the Merits of Others*, ſeems to have poyſoned the Pens, not only of ſome Poëts, but many alſo of other ſorts of *Writers*, who yet had not ſo ſpecious a pretext for the liberty they therein took; and who undertook by their Works to teach Men good Manners and Civility. So that I might, without much exerciſe of my Memory, call to mind Examples thereof among Authors of no obſcure fame in all Arts and Sciences; not excepting the graver, even *Hiſtorians*, *Philoſophers* and *Divines*. But leſt, by making a Catalogue of ſuch, I ſhould bring my ſelf alſo under the ſame condemnation; I leave them to Your own Collection.

ART.

ART. 4.

Only I think it no offence briefly to obſerve, that even *Tacitus* himſelf, eſteemed the Prince of *Latine Hiſtorians*, and the *Oracle* of *Polititians*, hath been accuſed of *Malignity*, in not only cenſuring the Counſels and Affections of all Great Men, whoſe moſt memorable Actions, together with their ſeveral Succeſſes and Events, he recordeth in his Hiſtories; but alſo in interpreting the ſame according to his private Conjectures, and wreſting them for the moſt part to ſiniſtre and ungenerous ends or intentions: thereby depriving thoſe *Heroes* of the beſt part of their Glory, *Virtue*; and leaving to Poſterity both

both Maxims and Precedents rather of *Cunning* and *Violence*, than of true Wiſdom and ſound Policy. Whether this Venerable Author, to whom the World is in other things ſo highly obliged, hath deſerved this accuſation, or not; I leave to Your judgement, who are ſufficiently converſant in his Writings to direct mine. In the mean time, I am obliged, in my own defence, to produce one of his *Accuſers* at leaſt. Permit me, then, to referr You to that famous *Critick*, and excellent *Grammarian*, *Gaſpar Scioppius*, who in many parts of his Writings, but more expreſly in his Diſſertation *de Hiſtorici Officio*, delivers a charge againſt *Tacitus* of this among other faults. You'll object perhaps, that *Scioppius* himſelf

ſelf is generally condemned for the ſame Vice of Malignity: and I think not without deſert; but yet you cannot deny him to have been a man of admirable acuteneſs in diſcerning the faults, errours and lapſes of other Writers; nor have I any where obſerved him to want reaſon for his Animadverſions. So that though I am alwayes offended at his bitter *invectives*, yet I confeſs, I am often pleaſed with the Sagacity of his *Criticiſms*.

ART. 5.

Now if ſuch Men, who had ground enough within the compaſs of their own great Parts, whereon to build to themſelves perpetual Monuments of Fame, were

were not altogether free from this malignant Humor; what may we think of those *poorer Spirits*, those *Sons of Earth*, who dream of erecting *Obelisks* to their own obscure Names, only out of the ruines of others? and like the *Souldier Crabb*, which *Aldrovand* calls Πιννόφυλαξ, and *Eremita*, have no Mansion for their credit, but that from whence they have extruded the right owner? These certainly have the Cancer of Envy rooted in their very breast: it being an Aphorism of daily Experience; that *the more imperfect men are in themselves, the more prone they are to defame and scoff at others.* The *Reason* of which, because I know You to be a great lover of the Philosophy of *Monsieur Des Cartes*, *Lib. de Passion. part. 3. art. 179.*

I ſhall give You in his Words; *quia cupiunt cæteros omnes in pari ſecum gradu videre*; ſince they are unable to raiſe themſelves to the height of their Superiours in Virtue and honour, they endeavour, by calumny and deriſion, to bring them down to the ſame ignoble level with themſelves.

## Art. 6.

This *diſeaſe*, therefore, of the Mind being almoſt *Epidemick*; and the *Cauſe* thereof conſiſting in a certain *Perverſity* of diſpoſition, whereby the Patient is ſtrongly inclined to be inwardly vexed and troubled at the Virtues or Felicities of others, and to do all he can to diminiſh their credit and eſtimation: the *Cure* of it,

it, I fear, is above the Art which I profeſs.

## Art. 7.

By this, *Sir*, You plainly diſcern the great *Difference* betwixt *Malignity*, and *Feſtivity* of Wit. For, as to this *latter*, which the Greeks name Ευτραπελία, the French, *Raillerie*, and we *Jeſting*; whereby a Man modeſtly and gently touches upon the Errours, Indecencies, or Infirmities of another, without any ſuſpicion of hate or contempt of his Perſon, pleaſantly repreſenting them as only ridiculous, not odious: I do not think it ought to be condemned as a vice of the Mind, but allowed as a Quality conſiſtent both with Honeſty and good

Manners, as denoting the Alacrity of his Diſpoſition, and Tranquillity of his Spirit (both ſigns of Virtue) and often alſo the Dexterity of his Wit, in that he is able to give a delightful and new colour to the abſurdity at which he moves his company to ſmile. Nor is it diſingenuous to *laugh*, when we hear the Jeſts of others: nay ſome jeſts are ſo facete and abſtracted from Perſons, that it would ſavour of too much dulneſs or Moroſity, not to be affected with their elegancy. But when we our ſelves break a jeſt, it is more decent to abſtain from Laughter, as well leſt what we ſay ſeem to occurr to our imagination unexpectedly, and by chance rather than choice; as leſt we be thought to admire the

felicity

felicity of our own Wit, in finding out that alluſion, which had eſcaped the notice of others preſent: both which are obnoxious to diſpraiſe; the *former*, as a mark of *ſlowneſs* of Conception; the *latter*, as an evidence of *Self-love*. To which may be added two other Reaſons. Firſt, whoever laughs at his own jeſt ſpoils it, by rendring it leſs apt to ſurpriſe the Hearers. Then again he puts all the company into jealouſie and examination of themſelves. Beſides all this (as Mr. *Hobbes* excellently obſerves, in his Book of *Humane Nature*) it is Vain-glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another ſufficient matter for his Triumph.

ART. 8.

But I have too long detained Your curious Eyes upon an object, in which You can take no other delight, but what muſt redound to You from Your obſervation of the vaſt diſparity betwixt the Deformities of it, and the charming beauties of Your own Candid and ſweet Diſpoſition. And being aſhamed, that I have led you all this while in a path ſo much trodden by others; I wiſh, the Province You were pleaſed to aſſign me, had lain ſomewhat farther from the road, wherein moſt Philoſophers have travelled before me, that I might have entertained You with remarks leſs obvious and common; whereas

whereas now I have been rather Your Remembrancer than Guide. Having at length waited on You to the End of it, good Manners oblige me, without desiring You to turn about and review the little things observed as You passed along (for that were to disparage Your excellent Memory, as well as to abuse Your Patience) to resign You up to Your own more usefull speculations, and the pursuit of that Generous Emulation, which incites You to Studies worthy Your choice, native Endowments, the Eminency of Your Condition, and the Place to which not Fortune, nor popular Favour, but Your own great Merits have raised You in the grand Council of this Kingdom.

THE END.